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CHECK FRAUD LITIGATION
CHECK FRAUD LITIGATION IN CONNECTICUT
AFTER THE 1990 REVISIONS TO THE U.C.C.
By TIMOTHY S. FISHER*
For as long as people have used checks to transfer money
some individuals have found ways to steal funds using checks.
The usual result is a contest between two innocent parties over
who should bear the loss from the fraud committed by a third.
In most check fraud cases the plaintiff is the owner of the
checking account involved in the fraud and is suing one or more
of the banks which honored the checks in question. In larger cases
the victim is usually a business which has been victimized by an
employee who had access to its check processing system.
Check fraud litigation is governed by Articles 3 and 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C." or the "Code"). While the
Code's treatment of check fraud law is comprehensive, the first
three decades of experience under the U.C.C. were not entirely
satisfactory. Readers of the Code found it dense and confusing.
Litigants found results unpredictable. Commentators found
numerous points for debate about construction of the statute,
highlighted by occasional conflicting interpretations in different
jurisdictions.
In response to these concerns, and to a perceived need to
modernize the statute, the Commissioners of Uniform Laws
promulgated revisions to Articles 3 and 4 in 1990 (the
"Revisions"). The Revisions were adopted in Connecticut in P.A.
91-304 and have been enacted so far in 36 other states. The
Revisions do much to clarify the law and to resolve inconsistent
interpretations among various courts. They also make some
substantive changes to the law which have an important bearing
on how check fraud disputes are resolved.
This article provides an overview of check fraud law, with
a focus on the changes brought about by the Revisions.2 The
*Of the Farmington Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Donn A. Randall, Managing Counsel, Shawmut Bank, N.A.
' Since they are substantive changes in the law the Revisions apply prospectively,
i.e., only to claims arising after October 1, 1991. B & B Corporation v. Lafayette American
Bank and Trust Co., 1994 Conn. Super. Lexis 1303 (1994).
'For a more detailed discussion of the law of check fraud before the Revisions,
see Timothy S. Fisher, THE CONNECrcuT LAW OF CHEcK FRAUn (Atlantic Law Books,
1991).
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article starts with an introduction to how check frauds are
perpetrated and discovered, followed by discussion of the
principal causes of action and defenses employed in check fraud
cases. This article focuses on Connecticut cases but will often
refer to authorities in other jurisdictions, since they are persuasive
in construing a uniform law. The article concludes with
observations regarding litigation strategies and some general
comments regarding this area of the law.
I. WHAT Is CHECK FRAUD?
The majority of check fraud cases arise when a thief gets
possession of someone else's check, forges either the drawer's
signature on the front of the check or the payee's endorsement
on the reverse, and then deposits it in an account under the thief's
control.' Thus, the thief interrupts the normal route followed by
a check to divert it to the thief's own account. The thief may
do this before a check is issued (e.g., stealing a blank check and
filling it out), or by intercepting a check after it is issued.
To understand check fraud it helps to remember the usual
route followed by a check and the role of each party to that
process. This process is illustrated by this sequence of events:
DRAWER: Person on whose account the check is
drawn. Signer of the check.
Delivers check to pay money to:
PAYEE: The person to whose order the check is
written on the front.
Endorses the back of the check and deposits it in:
DEPOSITARY BANK: The first bank in the collection
chain.
Forwards the check for collection to:
DRAWEE BANK: The bank on which the check is
drawn.
Returns check to its customer, the drawer, in a monthly
statement.
3 1n re Boardwalk Marketing Securities Litigation, 668 F.Supp. 115, 4 UCC Rep.
Serv. 2d 1464 (D.Conn. 1987).4 There are other less common forms of check fraud which are beyond the scope
of this article, such as altered checks and check kiting schemes. This article will focus
only on those frauds which include an unauthorized signature or endorsement.
[Vol. 68
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A. Typical Check Fraud Schemes
In the simplest check frauds the thief steals a blank check
from the owner of an account (the drawer). The thief then forges
the drawer's signature and makes the check payable to the thief.
The thief then deposits the check in his or her account. Once the
check clears (assuming no one discovers the fraud in time to stop
payment) the thief can take the proceeds and spend them or
disappear.
In a second common scheme the thief holds a job which
includes responsibility for issuing checks. (For example, the thief
approves invoices for payment.) The thief prompts the company
to issue a check (e.g. by approving a phony invoice), then he
gets possession of the check and forges the payee's endorsement
and deposits the check in his own account.
A third common check fraud involves a thief who works
inside the payee's business. In this case the thief steals the check
after it is received by the payee. (This can happen, for example,
when the thief works in the payee's mail room where checks are
received, or in the department which processes checks received
from customers.) The thief forges the endorsement of his or her
employer, the payee, and deposits the check in his or her own
account.
B. Common Elements of Check Fraud Cases
There are three features common to virtually every check
fraud case discussed in this article. First, the thief has either
disappeared or is judgment-proof (otherwise, the victim could
recover the funds from the wrongdoer).
Second, each fraud discussed in this article involves either
an unauthorized signature on the front of the check (where the
drawer signs) or an unauthorized endorsement on behalf of the
payee on the reverse.
Third, the great majority of check fraud cases involve a
claim against one or more banks by a business (since frauds
relating to personal checking accounts rarely involve enough
money to reach litigation).'
5 Less commonly, check fraud litigation involves actions between two banks over
allocation of a business victim's loss which has already been reimbursed by one of the
banks. Disputes between banks are governed chiefly by the warranties of presentment,
discussed in Part HI.D below. The Revisions also create a new warranty regarding the
microencoding at the bottom of checks. That warranty governs a new type of cteck
fraud, counterfeit checks.
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C. Prevention and Discovery of Check Fraud
Many checks pass through the hands of persons other than
the drawer and payee (such as bookkeepers, messengers, and
postal workers), so there are many opportunities for misappro-
priation. But check fraud leaves a "paper trail" such as bank
records which show what account the check was deposited in,
and who took funds out of that account. Thus, a thief will
generally not undertake a fraud unless the thief believes it will
not be detected. This is especially true with extended check
frauds, where the thief must be in a position not only to get
possession of checks but also to conceal the fraud.
The way to avoid such extended check frauds is by
"separation of functions." In a business, no single employee
should have complete control over the flow of funds A prudent
business examines the route followed by both incoming and
outgoing funds and makes sure that at least two people
(preferably in two departments) are aware of every check and
would know if it were misappropriated. This is generally
accomplished by balancing the company's own bank account
and by reconciling all incoming checks to the company's general
ledger. Absent such precautions, many extended check frauds
are discovered simply because they continue so long that a
significant amount of money is missing. In a small business, a
check fraud might be discovered when legitimate checks
bounce. In a larger company, the fraud might be discovered
when financial reviews show unusually low revenues or high
expenses in one department or another.
Once the victim starts to investigate, it usually can see how
the fraud occurred by following the checks' paper trail. Bank
records will reflect not only the ownership of the account into
which the check was deposited, but also the path followed by
all funds out of that account when the thief later removed the
funds. Moreover, banks make microfilm photocopies of the front
and back of every check. The company can (at some expense)
get microfilm copies of its own checks from its bank and
compare those to its record of legitimate expenses. The company
might also contact a customer who according to the victim's
books has not paid an invoice, then find that the customer can
6 See, e.g., Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 959 (3d Cir.
1993).
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produce a canceled check reflecting that payment. The back of
that check will show the thief's forgery of the named payee's
endorsement.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A CHECK FRAUD CASE
Once the victim of a check fraud learns of the fraud and
concludes that it will not be repaid by the thief, it usually looks
to be made whole by the banks through which the fraudulent
checks were deposited and paid. We will now turn to the law
governing such claims, first by determining what parties may
assert which check fraud claims, and against whom. This is
followed by a review of the elements of their causes of action,
then an examination of the defenses available to the banks.
A. Who Can Be The Plaintiff?
The drawer is the primary party entitled to assert a claim
in most check fraud cases. Where the drawer's own signature is
unauthorized, the drawer is clearly the victim; it is the one who
has "standing" to sue. The drawer is also the victim where the
drawer actually signed the check but unknowingly was induced
by the thief to issue it to a fictitious payee (e.g., to pay a fake
invoice). In these cases the drawer has lost its funds without
paying any debt it owes.
Even when the check was properly issued to a real payee,
if the check is stolen before reaching the payee, the drawer is
still the only party with the right to sue. This is because until the
payee receives the check, the drawer's obligation to pay the
payee is not considered discharged.7 The drawer must, therefore,
pay twice, so it is the party who has suffered the loss. (In some
cases the drawer will refuse to issue a second check, thereby
forcing the payee to sue the drawer who then may implead the
banks.) Only when the payee actually receives the check before
the thief steals it is the payee the party with the standing to sue.'
A person who is neither drawer nor payee will have
difficulty establishing a sufficient interest to bring an action over
a check fraud.'
7 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-3-420, Comment 1: "[I]f the check is never delivered to
the payee, the obligation owed to the payee is not affected." The U.C.C. in Connecticut
is found in CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-1-101, et seq. For the sake of brevity, this article
will cite to the abbreviated form "§ 1-101," et cetera.
8§ 3-420(a)(ii), Comment 1.
9 ee Sheiman v. Lafayette Bank & Trust Co., 4 Conn. App. 39, 492 A.2d 219, 40
UCC Rep. Serv. 1789 (1985).
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B. What Cause of Action?
The Revisions have created, in effect, two "tiers" of courses
of action for check fraud. They have adjusted but preserved the
pre-1990 "primary" causes of action, which do not require any
proof of negligence by a bank. The Revisions have also created
a new, more open-ended cause of action based purely on shared
culpability. That new theory of recovery is untested in the
reported caselaw so interpretation and prediction of its effect
can have little certainty. We address the primary causes of action
first.
There is only one section of the revised U.C.C. which
establishes a "primary" cause of action for drawers. That is the
"not properly payable" provision found in section 4-401. Under
section 4-401, any drawee bank which pays a check which is "not
properly payable" (e.g., the drawer's signature or the payee's
endorsement is unauthorized) may not deduct the amount of that
check from the drawer's account. If the bank does debit its
customer's account and refuses to recredit the funds, its
customer, the drawer, may sue under section 4-401.
The language of section 4-401 does not expressly state a
cause of action; it merely states that a bank may charge its
customers for a check that is properly payable. An argument can
be made that this merely is the statutory element which defines
the type of check which may be sued upon under some other
cause of action, such as the contractual account agreement
between customers and bank. In practice, however, the cases
have treated section 4-401 as if it established its own cause of
action."°
While jurisdictions were previously split on the issue, the
Revisions make it clear that drawers may not bring suit directly
against depository banks under the two causes of action
applicable to such banks: conversion (§ 3-420 Comment 1) and
the warranties of presentment-(§-3-417, Comment 2 and § 4-208).
By limiting drawers to direct suit-against their own drawee
bank, the Revisions have accomplished a major change in the
law: they have channeled a majority of check fraud claims
through the customer-bank relationship between the drawer and
the drawee bank. The bank and customer are in privity; their
10 See, e.g., Tonelli v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 41 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.Y.S.2d 858,363
N.E.2d 564, 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1344 (1977).
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relationship is generally governed by an account agreement."
Since the vast majority of checking account agreements are
written by banks and are not negotiated, they give banks the
opportunity to impose variations on the statutory scheme
imposed by the U.C.C. (see Part III.B. below).
A payee, as mentioned above, has standing to sue only where
a check it has already received is then stolen. In that situation,
the payee's cause of action is conversion under section 3-420. The
payee may sue either the depositary or drawee bank which paid
a check bearing an unauthorized endorsement in the payee's
name.
As mentioned above, the Revisions have created an entirely
new cause of action for apportionment of check fraud loss
according to shared culpability between victims and banks.
Those claims (discussed in more detail below, Part II.F.7) appear
to create a secondary cause of action available to a check fraud
victim whose primary claim is defeated by defenses related to
the victim's own negligence or responsibility for the fraud. The
"shared loss" provisions seem to allow a claim against any
culpable bank, thus reopening the potential for drawer claims
against depository banks. 2
There are other causes of action used in various check fraud
cases, depending on the particular facts. A Connecticut court has,
for example, recognized separate causes of action for breach of
restrictive endorsements and for common law negligence.'3
"IBut see Air One, Inc. v. United Bank, 1991 Conn. Super Lexis 426 (1991) where
the plaintiff's count alleging breach of the customer-bank contract prompted a defense
based on the statute of frauds.
12The "shared loss" provisions probably do not enable payees to sue on checks they
never received. The clauses allowing allocation of the loss are triggered by a bank s
culpability-based defense; a payee without standing to sue would be barred before
reaching those defenses.
" Healthcare, Inc. v. Dime Savings Bank of Wallingford, 1991 Conn. Super Lexis
925 (1991). Contra, Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States v. Okey, 812
F.2d 906,3 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1035 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that the common law cause
of action of negligence was "displaced" by the Code under the language of section 1-
103). See also Insurance Company of North America v. Chemical Bank, 13Conn. L. Trib.
No. 42 at 16 (October 26, 1987) (holding that the one year limitation period in § 4-406
governs common law causes of action as well as claims under the Code).
1994]
CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL
C. Elements of the Cause of Action
Once the proper plaintiff, defendant, and cause of action
are determined, the elements of a check fraud claim are simple.
Whether the claim is that the check was not properly payable,
or that it was converted under section 3-420, the key element of
either claim is that a signature or endorsement was forged or
otherwise unauthorized.
This means that check fraud claims, in their first instance,
do not require proof that the bank was negligent. If the signature
is unauthorized, then there is a cause of action. Issues of
culpability only come into play in defenses, or in backup claims
to apportion the loss where the initial claim fails.
The question of whether a signature or endorsement is
"unauthorized" is not as simple as it may at first appear, however.
The term "unauthorized signature" (which includes unautho-
rized endorsements) is defined at section 1-201(43) in quite broad
terms. " 'Unauthorized' signature means one made without
actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery."
The reference to "implied or apparent" authority is very
important since that refers to caselaw under the law of agency."
Agency law may enable banks to argue that even though a check
was signed by somebody without actual authority, there was
nonetheless either implied or apparent authority for the
signature. If successful, this argument negates the most
important element of a check fraud cause of action.
When a check requires more than one signature and
endorsement and is missing one but not all, the Code expressly
at § 3-403(b) defines the result as an unauthorized signature. The
U.C.C. does not, however, address the situation where a check
is presented without any endorsement, or without any drawer's
signature. Certainly such checks (which are not unheard of'") are
4 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. South Windsor Bank & Trust Co., 171
Conn. 63, 69, 368 A.2d 76, 19 UCC Rep. Serv. 578 (1976).
",See Hilltop Farm Inc. v. People s Savings Bank of New Britain, 1993 Conn. Super.
Lexis 475 (1993). See also Hutzler v. Hertz Corp., 39 N.Y.2d 209, 383 N.Y.S.2d 266, 347
N.E.2d 627, 18 UCC Rep. Serv. 1089 (1976), where an attorney forged his client's
endorsement on dual payee check conveying settlement proceeds. The New York Court
of Appeals stated: "our resolution of the issue before us is based on the principles of
agency .. " Hutzler and other cases regarding lawyers' forgeries of client endorsements
are discussed in ROBERT A. HILLMAN, JULIAN B. McDoNELL & STEVEN H. NicKLus,
COMMON LAW AND EQUTrY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, pp 14-4 to 14-9(1984).
16See, e.g., Sheiman v. Lafayette Bank & Trust Co., 4 Conn. App. 39,492 A.2d 219,
40 UCC Rep. Serv. 1789 (1985).
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"not properly payable" and thus actionable under section 4-401.
Less clear is whether the bank may assert various defenses to
claims based on such checks (see Part II.F.10 below).
D. Banks' Causes of Action.
Aside from causes of action available to the victim, there
are causes of action which enable banks to shift the loss to other
banks under certain circumstances. These are the warranties of
presentment in sections 3-417 and 4-208 of the Code. These
warranties put into effect the doctrine established by the ancient
case of Price v. Neal.
7
Price v. Neal established a fundamental policy of allocating
responsibility for check fraud among banks. Generally speaking,
a drawee bank is responsible for any unauthorized signature on
behalf of its customer, the drawer. This responsibility follows
from the fact that the drawee bank has a signature card to which
it could compare the drawer's signature on any check presented
to it.
Forgeries of the payee's endorsement, in contrast, are the
responsibility of depositary banks. The depositary bank is the
first bank in the chain of collection to deal with the thief; it has
the opportunity to question the thief's authority to deposit the
check on the payee's behalf. Further, since checks are usually
deposited into the account of the payee, the depositary bank is
the bank which has the opportunity to detect whether the payee's
endorsement is proper.
The warranties of presentment sections in 3-417 and 4-208
implement these policies by imposing a warranty by the
depositary bank that flows "downstream" through the collection
process along with the check." The depositary bank warrants that
it was "entitled to enforce" the check, meaning that it obtained
the check by "negotiation" through the authorized endorsement
of the payee. The depositary bank does not warrant that the
drawer's own signature is authorized, however, since as
established in Price v. Neal, the drawee bank is responsible for
fraud in connection with the signature of the drawer, its own
customer.
173 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
"
8 The depositor also makes these warranties, but since the depositor is usually the
thief, his or her warranties rarely have practical importance. For a case where they could
have helped but where the depositary bank instead unsuccessfully attempted a common
law indemnification claim against the thief, see Keyes Funeral Home v. Sanders, 1992
Conn. Super. Lexis 2344 (1992).
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With the benefit of these warranties, a drawee bank which
is sued over an unauthorized endorsement can pass the liability
on to the depositary bank. In practice, a drawee bank will prefer
not to have to hire a lawyer and participate in litigation, even
if it has impleaded the depositary bank and is unlikely to face
any exposure itself. Fortunately for drawee banks, the Code
provides a mechanism to drawee banks to "tender defense" of
the claim or "vouch-in" the depositary bank where the depositary
bank will bear the ultimate exposure for the claim.
"Vouching-in" under section 3-119 of the Code enables the
drawee bank to give notice of the claim to the depositary bank
and demand that the depositary bank take over the defense of
the claim. In practice this means that the depositary bank retains
counsel to defend the action in the name of the drawee bank.
A depositary bank which declines the invitation to defend the
litigation on behalf of the drawee bank will be bound by any
facts determined in that litigation.
Usually a depositary bank will accept the responsibility for
a claim and take over the defense. Failure to do so could lead
to a claim for the drawee bank's attorneys fees under section
3-417(d)(2), Comment 5. One court, however, has held that no
such attorneys fees claim is available to the drawee which
successfully defended the claim after the depositary bank
refused to take over the defense. 9
The Revisions include a new warranty regarding the
microencoding information at the bottom of checks. That
warranty governs a new type of check fraud which is growing
with the use of computers: counterfeit checks. A thief can use
a laser printer to create an instrument that looks like a check,
typically appearing to be drawn on a large commercial account
(like an insurance claim payment or dividend). The counterfeit
check will even appear to have a bank's microencoding at the
bottom of the check.' Commercially available ink is not readable
by banks' machine readers, however, so the check will be
rejected by the machinery and then examined by a bank
employee. Traditionally banks would reencode rejected checks
19 McCarthy Kenny & Reidy, P.C. v. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 402 Mass. 630, 524
N.E.2d 390,6 UCC Rep. Serv.2d 454 (1988).20Sucb a fraud is described in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Federal
Revenue Bank of New York, 620 F.Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) and in James J. White,
Goldstein's Curse: A Curious Case of Bank Fraud, 21 ToLEDo LAW REV. 599 (1990).
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so that they could still be processed, on the assumption that the
check was legitimate and was rejected because of machine error
or damage to the check itself.
If a bank does reencode a non-machine readable check, not
realizing that it is counterfeit, the check will clear and the funds
will be taken from the victim's account, leading to a dispute as
to who should bear that loss. Although the bank which reencoded
the check arguably should first have made inquiry as to the
reason it was not machine readable, the Code does not clearly
impose that result. The Revisions' new warranty of encoding
states that the person applying microencoding warrants that the
"information is correctly encoded." 4-209(a). If "correctly"
means that the reencoding accurately copies the original
counterfeit, there is no breach of warranty. On the other hand,
if "correctly" encoding a check means that it is encoded only so
as to accurately reflect the depositor's interest in the check, then
the warranty in section 4-209 will reinforce the duty of inquiry
suggested above.
E. Damages
The Code says almost nothing about damages. That is
understandable, since the great majority of check fraud actions
involve the loss of the entire proceeds of one or more checks.
Common law principles usually answer those questions that do
arise.
The only explicit provision on compensatory damages is in
section 3-420(b) which states that in a conversion claim "the
measure of liability is presumed to be the amount payable on
the instrument, but recovery may not exceed the amount of the
plaintiff's interest in the instrument." This language addresses
one of the most common issues regarding damages: the claim
by one of two co-payees where the other co-payee forged the
plaintiff's endorsement.2'
Damages disputes also occur where fraudulent checks were
used to pay valid debts of the plaintiff." This happens in
particular in disputes over corporate control, where two groups
simultaneously claim to be authorized to operate the business."
21E. ., Southern Calif. Permanente Medical Group v. Bozinouski, 148 Cal. App. 3d
503, 196 Cal. Rptr. 150, 37 UCC Rep. Serv. 7 (1983).
2Gotham-Vladimir Advertising, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 27 A.D.2d 190, 277
N.Y.S.2d 719 (1967).
23See, e.g., Air One, Inc. v. United Bank, 1991 Conn. Super Lexis 426 (1991).
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F. Defenses Based on Culpability
The causes of action discussed so far provide for liability
irrespective of the bank's exercise of care; if the check bears an
unauthorized signature, the elements of a claim have been
proven. The Code then provides defenses under five sections
relating in one way or another to culpability. These defenses arise
from the victim's conduct, such as its opportunity to prevent the
fraud or its failure to detect or act on the fraud after detection.
The Revisions have made significant changes in the language
of these defenses. The new statute improves on several
inconsistencies in the prior statutory language, and closes a
number of gaps among the defenses. The U.C.C. and its
predecessor, the Negotiable Instruments Law, provided
defenses based on the holdings of several major historical cases"
rather than a comprehensive approach to the field. The Revisions
depart from the narrower language of the original U.C.C.,
especially by a broader treatment of employee frauds where the
revised language more closely applies to those situations where
check fraud claims arise most often.
The first of the defenses discussed below is ratification,
where the victim fails to report a fraud after learning of it. The
remaining defenses are based on some form of negligence, where
the plaintiff either put the thief in a position to carry out the fraud,
or failed to detect an ongoing fraud once it started. These
defenses are discussed in the order in which they appear in the
Code.
1. Ratification: § 3-403(a)
The U.C.C. incorporates the common law concept of
ratification in section 3-403: "an unauthorized signature may be
ratified for all purposes of this Article."' Ratification of a check
fraud generally is found when the victim does three things: First,
the victim learns of the check fraud. Second, the victim either
"forgives" the thief (in the sense of deciding not to take action
as a result of the fraud) or decides to trust the thief to reimburse
the funds rather than reporting the fraud to the criminal
authorities or the banks through which the checks were paid.
24See, e.g., § 3-406, Comment 1, and its reference to Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253
(1 .Some cases analyze ratification as an after-the-fact agency relationship between
the victim and thief. E.g., Rakestraw v. Rodrigues, 8 Cal.3d 67, 104 Cal.Rptr. 57, 500
P.2d 1401, 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 780 (1972).
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Third, after some delay the victim changes his or her mind and
makes a claim against one of the banks.
There are several common settings where ratification
defenses succeed. One is fraud within a family, where the victim
is related to the thief and therefore has personal reasons not to
want to see criminal prosecution. The victim may hope that the
thief can be trusted to repay the funds or otherwise change his
or her ways."6 (While the Code does not affect criminal liability,
§ 3-403(c), many victims decide not to report frauds to criminal
authorities out of embarrassment or because of a personal
relationship with the thief.)
The lawyer-client relationship is a second common setting
for ratification, where a lawyer has forged her client's
endorsement on a check containing proceeds of litigation. Some
clients, after learning that their attorney has taken the funds, have
nonetheless trusted the attorney to "invest" or otherwise hold the
funds in safekeeping. After later learning that the attorney was
not to be trusted, those clients will generally be held to have
ratified the initial forgery of their endorsement on the settlement
check.27
A third common situation is continuing business relation-
ships, such as between a general contractor and subcontractor
on a construction project. A subcontractor may have been one
of two co-payees on a check from the owner of the project, and
then learned that the general contractor forged the subcontrac-
tor's endorsement and took all of the funds which were supposed
to be shared between the two. If the subcontractor decides to
trust the general contractor to make up for those funds out of
later payments, the subcontractor will probably be held to have
ratified the initial forgery of its endorsement on the dual-payee
check."
An important element of ratification is prejudice to the
defendant bank. While the statute does not expressly require that
the bank be prejudiced by the delay in reporting the fraud, courts
have been more likely to find ratification where the bank is in
fact prejudiced by the delay. This may be in part an indirect
26Eutsler v. First Nat'l Bank, Pawhuska, 639 P.2d 1245, 32 UCC Rep. Serv. 1509
(Okla. 1982).27E.g., Hendrix v. First Bank of Savannah, 195 Ga.App. 510,394 S.E.2d 134, 12 UCC
Rep. Serv. 2d 761 (1990).28E.g., Thermo Contracting Corp. v. Bank of New Jersey, 69 N.J. 352, 354 A.2d
291, 18 UCC Rep. Serv. 1096 (1976)
19941
CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL
inquiry into the victim's intent. The court may conclude that the
victim delayed reporting the fraud because it thought it would
have more success recovering the stolen funds before the fraud
was reported than afterwards. If so, that delay may not reflect
an intent to ratify the fraud. 9
2. Imposters: § 3-404(a)
Banks have a defense to claims by victims who are so
careless as to issue a check to a thief impersonating the payee °
or claiming to be an agent of the payee. In such cases, the thief's
endorsement "is effective as the endorsement of the payee," thus
negating that essential element of the cause of action.
3. Fictitious Payees: § 3-404(b)
Subsection 3-404(b) also makes an unauthorized endorse-
ment "effective" under certain circumstances. Section 3-404(b)
applies when a thief induces the victim to issue checks which
the thief then intercepts and deposits in an account under his or
her own control. The thief usually has some role in the victim's
check-issuing process and prompts the victim to issue a check
payable either to a non-existent payee (so that no one is expecting
to receive the check), or issues the check to a real payee when
that payee is not expecting to receive the check.3'
The policy underlying section 3-404(b) is that a business
which gives the thief control over its check-writing system should
not be able to pass its resulting losses on to the bank. When the
victim has not only given the thief the power to choose the payee
of the check but also the ability to intercept the check, the victim
has created a situation ripe for fraud."
4. Embezzlements by Employees: § 3-405
Section 3-405 provides banks with a defense to claims where
the fraud was committed by an employee entrusted with
"responsibility" for checks. This section applies both to incoming
checks (where the business is the payee on checks coming into
it but are intercepted internally) and to outgoing checks (i.e.,
those being issued by the victim). Like the defenses under 3-
29Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 39 Conn.
Supp. 240, 476 A.2d 1083 (1982), aff'd, 2 Conn. App. 110, 476 A.2d 1077 (1984).3 0Fair Park Nat. Bank v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 541 S.W.2d 266,20 UCC Rep. Serv.
454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).3 1Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n. v. United States, 552 F.2d 302, 21
UCC Rep. Serv. 872 (9th Cir. 1977).32Since such thieves are usually employees of the victim, there is often an overlap
between this defense and section 3-405, relating to employee theft.
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404(a) and (b), this defense relates only to unauthorized
endorsements, not frauds in connection with the drawer's
signature.
5. Negligence: § 3-406
Section 3-406 creates a broad "comparative negligence"
defense. This section applies both to drawer's signatures and
endorsements, but only in the case of forgeries (not other types
of unauthorized signatures). This section provides that if the
victim of the fraud did not exercise ordinary care, and that failure
substantially contributed to the forgery, then the victim is
precluded from asserting the forgery against the bank. If the
bank failed to exercise ordinary care as well, then section
3-406(b) provides for apportionment of the loss.
6. Customers' Review of Monthly Statements: § 4-406(d)
The final section creating a defense based on culpability
relates to a customer's (drawer's) review of its bank statements.
Section 4-406 requires that an account owner review her monthly
statements to find any check on which her signature was forged
or unauthorized. If the customer does not discover and report
the fraud, then the bank has a defense to a claim for paying not
only that check but also later checks by the same thief (after a
notice period of 30 days).
7. Allocation of Loss in the Case of Shared Culpability
The preceding five defenses each incorporates a new
concept to the Uniform Commercial Code, the allocation of a
loss between two culpable parties "according to the extent to
which" their failure "to exercise ordinary care contributed to the
loss." (§§ 3-404(d), 3-405(b), 3-406(b), 4-406(c) ) Before the
Revisions to Articles 3 and 4, the rule was quite different.
Negligence by the victim precluded any recovery from the bank,
but if the bank was also negligent it could not assert the defense
at all.
The Revisions reject this "all or nothing" approach and call
for a comparison of the negligence on each side.33 As of this
writing, no cases have been officially reported dealing with this
feature of revised Articles 3 and 4, so it is not yet possible to say
3 3This approach is criticized by Henry Bailey, former author of BRADY ON BANK
CHECKS. Henry Bailey, New 1990 Uniform Commercial Code: Article 3, Negotiable
Instruments, and Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collections 29 WLuAMEmrE LAw REv.
409 (1993). The Revisions introduce "a tort concept of comparative negligence that does
not belong in a commercial law statute." Id. at 487.
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what impact the shared liability provisions will have.' Most likely
they will be pled as "fall-back" claims by a victim against a bank,
where the victim anticipates a culpability-based defense by the
bank. In the event of such a defense, the claim for shared liability
will provide a source for at least a partial recovery.
The shared loss clauses of the revised Code are drafted
broadly enough to be used in other situations, as well. For
example, the language of the shared culpability provisions would
allow them to be used as a third-party cause of action by a bank
defendant against any other person who contributed to the loss.
(An example of that is given in Case Study No. 5 of Comment
2 to section 3-404, and also in the discussion at the very end of
Comment 3 to that section.)
Two of the sections which state the comparative fault rule
also address the burden of proof. Sections 3-406(c) and 4-406
place the burden on each party to prove the other's negligence.'
The Revisions do not say whether this is also the case in the other
sections on comparative fault.
8. Examples of Negligence by the Business Victims
The concept of "failure to exercise ordinary care" is of great
importance in check fraud cases. Negligence on the part of the
victim is the chief means available to banks to avoid liability for
check fraud claims which are not time-barred. "Ordinary care"
is inherently an issue of fact, and therefore somewhat
unpredictable. Over the years, however, the caselaw has
developed a number of situations where the courts will generally
find negligence by a business victim to check fraud.36 They
include:
" hiring a new employee without any background check
which would have disclosed a history of misconduct;"
* leaving checks unguarded at the office (Section 3-405,
Comment 3, Case No. 1);
34Arkansas adopted a comparative negligence rule on its own several years earlier
by amending § 3-406 to incorporate Arkansas general comparative negligence rule. An
attempt to apply its provisions is found in Union National Bank of Little Rock v.
Daneshvan, 33 Ark. App. 171,803 S.W.2d 567 (1991).
35This is a change from prior law under 3-406 in Connecticut, which imposed on
the bank the burden of proving its own due care. Perley v. Glastonbury Bank & Trust
Co., 170 Conn. 691, 368 A.2d 149, 19 UCC Rep. Serv. 188 (1976).
36 See also cases discussed in John M. Norwood, Negligence as an Exception to the
Forgery Doctrine: When Does It Exist? 25 UNwo m COMMERCIAL LAW Rpma. 169 (1992).
37 Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, 636
F.2d 1051, 30 UCC Rep. Serv. 1185 (5th Cir. 1981).
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" insufficient supervision of the employee;38
* allowing the employee to keep the company's books out of
the office;39
* allowing the thief both to have possession of the checks and
some control over the bookkeeping of the company, such
as the responsibility for balancing the checking account,"0 the
authority to write off reportedly bad debts, or the authority
to approve invoices;
* lack of audits (either internal audits in the case of large
businesses, or external audits by an accounting firm, in the
case of any business);"
* failure to inquire into irregularities such as insufficient funds
or other notices from the bank."'
9. Bank Negligence
It is difficult to compare the negligence of banks to the
negligence of businesses victimized by check frauds. Businesses
usually have several ways to avoid or detect a fraud; their
negligence usually continues throughout the scheme. Thus, their
negligence is multi-faceted and continuing. Banks, in contrast,
usually have only a single opportunity to exercise ordinary care
as to each check.
Consider this point first with regard to fraudulent
endorsements. The banking system can interrupt a fraudulent
endorsement scheme at the moment that the check is presented
for deposit. This is a single opportunity, but a big opportunity,
since a bank employee is actually looking at the check which
bears the unauthorized endorsement. (In some cases a bank is
found negligent for letting the thief open the account into which
he later deposits the checks. Especially where the thief opens an
account in the name of a business, the bank is expected to
demand documentary evidence of a legitimate corporate
existence, such as a banking resolution by the corporate board
3 8Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 949 (3d Cir. 1993).39Husker News Co. v. South Ottumwa Say. Bank, 482 N.W.2d 404, 19 UCC Rep.
Serv. 2d 203 (Iowa 1992).40Read v. South Carolina Nat. Bank, 286 S.C. 534, 335 S.E.2d 359, 42 UCC Rep.
Serv. 974 (1985).41American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Fidelity, 691 F.2d 464, 34 UCC Rep. Serv. 1228 (8th
Cir. 1982).
42Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Lodge, 164 Conn. 604, 325 A.2d 222 (1973).
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of directors and a tax identification number. 3)
The cases have identified several situations that are
commonly identified as negligence on the part of a bank when
a check with an unauthorized endorsement is deposited. Several
jurisdictions have held that when a check payable to a business
is deposited into a personal account, that is an "unreasonable
commercial banking practice as a matter of law,"" since
businesses usually deposit their revenues into their own accounts
rather than endorsing them over to other parties. (The opposite
conclusion was reached in a Connecticut case, however, where
the payee's employee endorsed the checks with his employer's
company name, followed by "For Deposit Only A/C 4284186"
which was his personal account. 5) The plaintiff may also prevail
by proving that the bank did not follow its own procedures."
Finally, the bank may be negligent if one of its officers has actual
knowledge of some irregularity relating to the check or the
account involved. 7
While there is extensive caselaw relating to bank negligence
in connection with unauthorized endorsements, there is less
guidance relating to bank negligence as to unauthorized drawers'
signatures. Moreover, this is an area which has been dramatically
changed by the Revisions. The courts previously struggled over
a drawee bank's duty to detect a forged or unauthorized drawer's
signature by comparing each check to the drawer's signature
card on file. As the number of checks cleared daily by banks has
increased, fewer and fewer banks actually have employees
routinely looking at signature cards. One court found this to be
negligence per se, precluding any defense based on the victim's
own negligence."
43E.g., Walters v. Alden State Bank., 155 Mich. App. 29, 399 N.W.2d 432, 3 UCC
Rep. Serv. 2d 174, app. den., 428 Mich. 866 (1987); Wheat State Service Corp. v. Volfax
Nat'l Bank, 44 Colo. App. 376,618 P.2d 696,31 UCC Rep. Serv. 638 (Col. Ct. App. 1980);
Keyes Funeral Home v. Sanders, 1992 Conn. Super. Lexis 2344 (1992); 33-406, Comment
4. Compare, Hilltop Farm, Inc. v. People's Savings Bank of New Britain, 1993 Conn.
Super. Lexis 475 (1993).44Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hepler State Bank, 6 Kan. App. 2d 543, 640 P.2d
721, 32 UCC Rep. Serv. 187 (1981).45 Hartford Accident & Indemnity v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 39 Conn. Supp. 240,
476 A.2d 1083 (1982), aff'd, 2 Conn. App. 110 476 A.2d 1077 (1984). (The trial court
opinion describes effective testimony by the defendant's expert witness regarding banks'
reliance on due care by their business account holders.)
4E Sun Bank/Miami, N.A. v. First Nat. Bank of Maryland, 698 F.Supp. 1298(D.Md. 198).u
4 7 Dykstra v. Nat1 Bank of South Dakota, 328 N.W.2d 862, 35 UCC Rep. Serv. 553
(S.D. 1983).
,"Medford INigation District v. Western Bank, 66 Or. App. 589, 676 P.2d 329, 38
UCC Rep. Serv. 411 (1984).
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This is no longer necessarily the case under the new
definition of "ordinary care" with respect to banks, section 3-
103(7). That subsection states that it is not negligent for a bank
to pay a check without actually looking at the signature, let alone
comparing it to the signature card, if that procedure is in
accordance with the bank's own practice and industry standards.
(Industry standards are by no means uniform on this point; many
banks still claim to examine all drawers' signatures, at least on
all checks above a threshold amount.)
If the drawee bank does not look at checks presented for
payment to examine the drawer's signature, then there will
probably be no contact with the check by any employee of the
drawee bank. (A teller at the depository bank will have handled
the check, and then another employee of the depositary bank
will have read the check to determine its dollar amount and apply
the microencoding at the bottom of the check. Thereafter, only
machines handle the check, sorting it and charging accounts
based on the microencoding information.) Thus, it will be
uncommon for a drawee bank to be found negligent based on
the appearance of the check itself. 9 Moreover, the drawee bank
will generally have no contract with the thief. The thief usually
opens an account at the depositary bank where he deposits the
misappropriated checks. The drawee bank, however, has the
account only of the innocent drawer. Those situations where a
drawee bank may still be found negligent will probably be where
the thief was the drawer's employee responsible for banking, and
acted in a way which suggested improprieties.'
10. Missing Signatures
The Code is silent about defenses to checks which lack any
drawer's signature or any endorsement. While earlier drafts of
the Revisions provided defenses to claims that a check "lacked
authorized signature," the final version rejected that approach.
Instead, the culpability-based defenses only are effective against
claims based on "unauthorized signatures" and "unauthorized
endorsements." This rejects pre-Revision authority in some
19 See discussion in John J. A.Burke, Loss Allocation Rules of the Check Payment
System With Respect to Forged Drawer Signatures and Forged Indorsements: An
Explanation of the Present and Revised UCC Articles 3 and 4, 25 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE LAW JounAr.L 318 at 346-48 (1993).50E.g., D&G Equipment Co. v. First Nat'! Bank of Greencastle, Pennsylvania, 764
F.2d 950,41 UCC Rep. Serv. 154 (3d Cir. 1985).
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jurisdictions,"' but confirms pre-Revision authority in Con-
necticut." When only one of two required signatures is missing,
however, the Revisions at section 3-403(b) and most pre-Revision
cases' deem there to be an unauthorized signature, thus giving
recourse to the statutory defenses.
The Revisions change the test for determining whether a
check naming two payees requires endorsements by both or just
one. Old section 3-116 stated a requirement that all payees must
endorse an instrument if not payable to them "in the
alternative." New section 3-110(d) says that if the instrument
"is ambiguous as to whether it is payable to the persons
alternatively, the instrument is payable to the persons
alternatively," i.e., any one can endorse for them all.
G. Time-based Defenses
The defenses discussed so far arise from negligence and
other concepts related to culpability; those are nearly always
questions of fact. Unless a case falls within a well-defined area
of reasonable or unreasonable conduct under the caselaw and
the negligence is all on one side, the outcome of the dispute will
be hard to predict. Such cases will not be susceptible to summary
judgment.
Defenses based on the passage of time, in contrast, are easy
to prove. The paper trail of each check includes machine stamps
of the dates on which it is handled by each bank. Therefore each
check (and if the check is lost, banks' microfilm copies of the
check) contains most information necessary to prove or disprove
a defense under the statute of limitations.
The Revisions complement this factual clarity by simplify-
ing the limitations periods for check fraud claims. Section 3-
118(g) establishes a universal three-year period for all check
fraud claims brought under the U.C.C.
Before the Revisions, the U.C.C. did not state a limitations
period for check fraud cases. The Code left the courts to look
to local law for the limitations period applicable to the particular
5' Jacoby Transportation Systems, Inc. v. Continental Bank, 277 Pa. Super. 440, 419
A.2d 1227, 28 UCC Rep. Serv. 1398 (1980).51Travelers Ins. Co. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 40 Conn. Supp. 70, 481 A.2d
111, 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 253 (1984).
Summarized and approved in B & B Corporation .v. Lafayette American Bank
and Trust Co., 11 Conn.L.Rptr. No 17, 1994 Conn. Super. Lexis 1303 (1994).
"Robert M. and Geraldine C. Burney" was held to require both endorsements in
Perley v. Glastonbury Bank & Trust Co., 170 Conn. 691, 368 A.2d 149, 19 UCC Rep.
Serv. 188 (1976).
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cause of action.' The problem with that approach was that some
check fraud claims could be expressed alternatively as either a
tort-based cause of action or a contract-based cause of action.
In Connecticut, like most states, tort and contract claims
followed different limitations periods (usually' longer for
contract actions). This dichotomy encouraged plaintiffs to use
circuitous actions in order to claim longer limitations periods."
The situation was confused further by the use of the ancient cause
of action of "money had and received," an implied contract claim
originally used to recover money mistakenly paid when in fact
no obligation existed to pay."7
The new section 3-118(g) establishes a three-year limitations
period for claims in conversion, money had and received, and
breach of warranty, as well as any other claims arising under
Article 3 for which a limitations period is not otherwise
established, such as a drawer's claim against its bank under
section 4-401 for honoring a check which was not properly
payable.
The Code has several other time limitations applicable to
check fraud claims. A customer has only one year under Section
4-406(f) to report a claim against its own bank for paying a check
on which the drawer's own signature is unauthorized or which
is altered in its amount. (Note this is a deadline for notice, not
for filing suit. Problems inherent in that distinction are discussed
in Bailey, supra, n.34, at 561-564.)
Section 3-118(g) does not expressly state a limitations period
for a customer's claim against its drawee bank brought under
their account agreement. Arguably, such a claim alleges breach
of a written contract, and thus does not assert a "right arising
under this Article." (3-118(g)(iii)). In Connecticut such a claim
would probably be subject to the six-year limitations period for
claims on written contracts. (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584). Banks
could shorten that period by the terms of the account agreement,
'Kuwait Airways Corp. v. American Security Bank, N.A., 890 F.2d 456, 10 UCC
Rep. Serv. 2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
'
6 A different effort to avoid the statute of limitations failed in Aduskevich v.
Connecticut National Bank, 1990 Conn. Super. Lexis 1695 (1990), where the plaintiffs
had alleged that the bank had a duty to warn them that their claim could become time-
barred.
57 Stelco Industries, Inc., d/b/a Stevenson Lumber Co. v. State Nat'l Bank of
Connecticut, et. al., 4 Conn L. Trib. No. 51 (Nov. 22, 1978) (No. 171931); Peerless
Insurance Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank-New Braunfels, N.A., 791 F.2d 1177, 1 UCC
Rep. Serv. 2d 622 (5th Cir. 1986); Hechter v. New York Life Ins. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 34, 412
N.Y.S.2d 812, 385 N.E.2d 551, 25 UCC Rep. Serv. 537 (1978).
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however."
The warranties of presentment between banks have their
own notice periods. Sections 3-417(c) and 4- 208(e) now require
that the "claimant" (drawee bank) give notice of a claim for
breach of warranty to the "warrantor" (depositary bank) within
thirty days after the drawee bank learns of the breach." Absent
prompt notice, the depositary bank is discharged to the extent
of any loss caused by the delay. § 3-417(c).
III. OVERALL IMPACT OF THE REVISIONS
A. Clarification
One of the most important things which the Articles 3 and
4 Revisions have done is to "clean up" the existing statute. The
wording of Articles 3 and 4 was often problematical, with
inconsistent provisions between the two articles' and rules which
seemed counter to common sense." These anomalies led to
inconsistent holdings in different jurisdictions." By eliminating
these drafting problems, the Revisions have reduced some of the
uncertainty in check fraud cases and should reduce some of the
time and energy which has been spent on court battles.
A second major change of the Revisions has been the
universal three-year limitations period for check fraud claims.
This will eliminate the unpredictability and confusion regarding
the limitations periods under the prior Code.
B. Expanded Role of Bank-Customer Relationship
A third major change is that a larger percentage of check
fraud claims will be asserted by drawers against their own
banks." The Revisions have accomplished this by eliminating
two other avenues of recourse which had been asserted under
the previous code. After the Revisions a payee is no longer
entitled to sue on a check unless it had possession of it before
5 8 New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 41 A.D.2d 912, 343 N.Y.S.2d 538, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 717 (1973).59 The rule before the Revisions required notice "within a reasonable time," a
standard which led to varying results. Compare Home Indemnity Co. v. First Nat'l Bank
of Waukegan, 659 F.2d 796, 31 UCC Rep. Serv. 1664 (7th Cir 1981) (six weeks delay
held to be unreasonable) with First Natl Bank of Neenah v. Security Nat'l Bank of
Springfield, 32 UCC Rep. Serv. 926 (D. Mass. 1981) (five months not unreasonable).
wFor example, it was unclear whether "negligence" in old section 3-406, "reasonable
commercial standards" in old section 3-419(3), and "ordinary care" in old section 4-406(3)
were all the same standard.61 For example, the two different damages rules in old section 3-419(2).6 2 For example, see the discussion in Comment 1 to new section 3-420.
6 At the same time the Revisions create a new cause of action for comparative fault
against any culpable party. This discussion relates only to a plaintiff's first recourse: the
causes of action for full recovery irrespective of negligence.
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the fraud. § 3-420, Comment 1. Instead, the drawer will have to
pay twice and then sue its own bank for the fraud. The second
cause of action eliminated by the Revisions existed in several
jurisdictions where drawers were allowed to sue depository
banks directly for breach of the warranties of presentment. The
Revisions have rejected that approach, concluding that the
warranties are only for the benefit of the banks in the check
collection system. § 3-417, Comment 1.
There are important implications to channeling check fraud
claims through the customer-drawee bank relationship. In cases
of forged endorsements it brings the drawee bank, an innocent
party, into the dispute where the depositary bank is the ultimate
bearer of the loss. Requiring a drawer to make a claim against
its own drawee bank instead of the ultimate defendant could
entail some loss of judicial economy, and forces the drawee bank
to deal with a claim which is ultimately not its responsibility."
This is of limited importance, however, since in most cases the
drawee bank is able to induce the depositary bank to step in and
defend the claim directly. (See the discussion of "vouching in"
in part II.D above.)
The channeling of check fraud claims through the bank-
customer relationship has an even more important implication.
The parties to such claims are in an ongoing business relationship
which may facilitate prompt settlement of the claim. Where the
customer is important to the bank and has a long-standing
relationship, the bank will be more likely to give the customer
the benefit of the doubt regarding the claim. Any personal
relationship between representatives of the bank and the
customer may make it easier for them to discuss settlement
without resort to litigation.
Above all, claims between customers and their banks will
usually be governed by a written checking account agreement.
That will give the bank the opportunity to add terms to the
agreement which will control the resolution of check fraud
claims. This is expressly sanctioned by section 4-103 which allows
the parties, within certain limits, to vary the terms of Article 4
by agreement. (Section 1-103 of the U.C.C. has a comparable
provision with respect to the entire Code.) Just as banks have
64 Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass.
1, 184 N.E.2d 358, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 195 (1962).
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used the account agreement to impose shorter notice periods,
banks might provide for binding arbitration or other forms of
alternative dispute resolution instead of or as a prerequisite to
litigation.
C. Comparative Fault
Perhaps the greatest change in the law of check fraud is the
Revisions' introduction of the concept of comparative fault.
Check fraud litigation will no longer necessarily yield "all or
nothing" results. This change may reflect the drafters' experience
in litigation where slight variations in facts could cause
dramatically different results. (Any negligence on the part of the
bank precluded a defense under old sections 3-406 and 4-406(e).)
The authors of the Revisions believed that comparative fault will
facilitate settlements since parties will be less likely to hold out
for total victory in litigation.' Comparative fault in check fraud
will be hard to apply, however, because the negligent conduct
of check fraud victims is different in kind from banks'
negligence. As discussed above (Part II.F.9), check fraud victims'
negligence is generally a collection of many incidents of
carelessness; bank negligence, in contrast, arises out of direct
contact with the fraudulent checks, but contact which is isolated
in time and with little knowledge of the relationship between the
thief and the victim. It may prove hard in practice for triers of
fact to compare degrees of two very different types of
negligence.
IV. LITIGATION STRATEGIES
A. Plaintiffs
Several litigation strategies can be particularly effective for
check fraud victims asserting claims against banks. One is to
make a large "blow up" of the check for the jury. That will make
it easier for the jury to visualize the instrument that the bank teller
looked at when he or she accepted the check for deposit.
Often plaintiffs may find that the bank failed to follow its
own procedures in some way. Discovery of the bank's operations
manuals can disclose this. Teller training material may give even
more detailed descriptions of the steps tellers can take to detect
and prevent frauds.
6 See "Prefatory Note" to the Revisions: "by the provisions of sections 3-404 through
3-406 which reform rules for allocation of loss from forgeries and alterations, the Revisions
should significantly reduce litigation."
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Plaintiffs should always, in addition to the primary cause of
action, plead alternatively for apportionment of the loss
according to shared culpability. This has several advantages.
First, it allows the plaintiff to sue multiple banks, rather than
simply the bank against which it has a primary claim. The more
defendants there are, the more contributors to a settlement fund
there may be. Further, it would be risky for the plaintiff to rely
exclusively on recovery under the primary theory when there is
any possibility of a culpability-based defense. Third, by pleading
the apportionment claims, the plaintiff will introduce bank
culpability as a relevant issue in the litigation. (The plaintiff's own
neglect will already be relevant if a bank asserts any of the
defenses based on culpability.) This will broaden dis'covery of
bank operations, and provide additional arguments either for
settlement or for recovery.
Finally, plaintiffs can allege claims under the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act against banks." The potential for
attorneys fees, punitive damages, and even class actions (where
the plaintiff is challenging a practice applied to all bank
customers, for example) can improve the plaintiff's bargaining
position.
B. Defendants
One of the most important things a bank can do once sued
in check fraud is to make contact with the thief. The person who
carried out the fraud will usually be a former employee of the
victim. Before the thief could carry out the fraud, he or she had
to spend a lot of time and energy thinking through the
weaknesses in his or her employer's bookkeeping system. The
thief will have a wealth of information about what the victim
could have done to stop the fraud.
Banks are required promptly to report check frauds to
regulatory authorities, so the thief will either be subject to
criminal prosecution already or be aware that prosecution is
pending. While a bank cannot withhold a criminal referral in
return for cooperation by the thief, the bank can bargain with
the thief over the bank's position at a sentencing hearing.
"Normand Josef Enterprises Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank, 230 Conn. 486,
A.2d (1994). But cf. )wyer Products Corp. v. Lafayette Bank & Trust Co., 1991
o-n. Super. Lexis 349 (1991) and Westwood Group, Inc. v. Polis, 1991 Conn. Super.
Lexis 1241 (1991), where the plaintiffs alleged insufficient facts to assert an unfair trade
practice.
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A second important strategy for banks is discovery of the
victim's outside accountants. Most plaintiffs in large check frauds
are businesses whose books are reviewed to some extent by
certified public accountants. Accountants have well-defined
rules about reporting to management any material weakness in
a company's systems which might allow a fraud. In some
instances the accountant will have written a management letter
to the business warning it of such a weakness. Even in the absence
of a formal management letter, work papers prepared by the
accounting firm staff during its periodic reviews may show some
awareness of potential weaknesses. In some instances the
accounting firm will have delivered an opinion to the defendant
bank about the plaintiff's financial condition (e.g., in connection
with loans to the plaintiff from the bank); in such cases the bank
might have a cause of action directly against the accounting firm
for misrepresenting the company's condition due to the
accountant's failure to detect and disclose a fraud. 7
Another strategy for banks is to prepare "flow charts" for
the jury to demonstrate how the fraud was carried out.
Depending on the nature of the fraud, such an exhibit might
enable the bank to illustrate how small the bank's role in the fraud
was and how large was the role of the plaintiff's own negligence.
A related strategy is to prepare an enlarged list of the different
things the plaintiff did which allowed the fraud to occur. The
bank wants to create the impression that the plaintiff had
multiple opportunities to detect or prevent the fraud, in contrast
to the bank's more limited opportunity.
A final strategy for defendants (and perhaps for plaintiffs
as well) is to prepare a chart for the court illustrating the "layout"
of the litigation: the different counts of the complaint, the
theories of liability, and the relevant defenses. Check fraud cases
are difficult to understand, due to their technical terminology
and complicated statutory provisions. It can be of great
assistance to the court, whether on a motion for summary
judgment or at trial, to be able to visualize the role of each issue
in the overall litigation.
67Cf. Samuel S. Paschall, Liability to Non-Clients: The Accountant's Role and
Responsibility, 53 Missoui LAW REVIEW 693 (1988); R. James Gormley, The Foreseen,
the Foreseeable and Beyond - Accountant's Liability to Nonclients, 14 SETON HALL LAW
REvIEw 528 (1984).
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V. WHY IS CHECK FRAUD LAW So CONFUSING?
The law of check fraud is difficult to master partly because
the terminology is so arcane and the transactions can be so
complicated. Also, the layout of Articles 3 and 4 is not easy for
the unfamiliar reader to follow. But a large part of the difficulty
of check fraud loss follows from its unpredictability. Even under
the revised U.C.C., seemingly minor variations in factual
patterns can yield very different results. Also, some situations can
be analyzed in different ways, again yielding variable outcomes.
One would expect that the law of check fraud would not
be so unpredictable. After all, every check fraud case involves
the same instrument: a check, which always has the same basic
components and the same parties. Moreover, every check is
processed for collection by the banking system in the same way.
A comprehensive code like the U.C.C. can address all issues
presented in check fraud cases consistently with each other rather
than piecemeal. And the U.C.C. has been adopted in close to
a uniform fashion in all states, thereby giving the opportunity
for the law of check fraud to be consistent through all
jurisdictions.
In spite of favorable conditions for a consistent and
predictable body of law, however, the outcomes of check fraud
cases in practice too often are not predictable. There are several
reasons for this, starting with drafting problems. Much of the
Uniform Commercial Code was written by expanding upon the
provisions of the Negotiable Instrument Law which in turn
largely consisted of codifications of the holdings of major cases
from prior history. The result was that no single theory explained
all related provisions of the Code;68 the Code's approach was to
make generalizations from old cases, without necessarily
covering all the ground between those cases' holdings."
The process of drafting of Articles 3 and 4 in the 1950s also
contributed to the problem. The two articles interrelated but
their language was sometimes inconsistent. Moreover, both
articles were written by attorneys who chiefly represented
" HILLMAN, McDONNELL & NicKLEs, COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, supra, n15, pp 14-4 to 14-9.0 9Daube v. Bruno, 493 So.2d 606, 608, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 277, 230 (La. 1986):
"Article 3 ... is not a preemptive, systematic and comprehensive treatment of its area
of coverage. . ... Rather, it sets forth a few particular rules which were singled out for
treatment because they either resolved a conflict in or were a change from the former
rules found under the NIL."
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financial institutions; there was no significant consumer
movement with regard to financial transactions in the 1950s. As
a result, much of the language of the Code was very favorable
to banks. This may have induced courts to apply tortured
reasoning to achieve what they perceived as more fair results
than the language would allow. This occurred especially because
check fraud cases are heard by courts of common jurisdiction,
rather than a specialty court. As a result, the judges who hear
check fraud cases tend to rely heavily on common law doctrines
and bring concern for equity and fairness in the immediate case,
with less concern for the overall statutory scheme of the Code
than could be the case if there were a special court for U.C.C.
cases.
Even if all of these factors were eliminated, however, check
fraud cases would still be unpredictable. It will always be
difficult to allocate the loss from check fraud because we look
to checks to perform so many different functions, and serve so
many different, competing goals."0 Society as a whole looks to
checks to be a safe form of payment, so that they can, for
example, be sent through the mail without the risk of losing the
funds if the check itself is lost. This necessarily means that a stolen
check which is paid by the bank should be the bank's loss, not
the consumer's loss. At the same time, however, banks cannot
be expected to absorb the loss of all check frauds and still keep
checking account fees reasonable, nor can banks be expected to
process checks with the speed that we desire if banks are also
expected to examine each check in detail for any fraud
detectable on the face of the check.
Because of these and other policies, the law of check fraud
will always present a challenge in drawing the line between losses
to be borne by the banks and losses to be born by the victims
of fraud. By choosing to balance these competing goals instead
of leaning entirely to one side or the other of these disputes, we
require parties and the courts to examine close cases and make
the difficult judgment of how to allocate the loss. Where the loss
will ultimately fall depends on too many factors to predict in
every instance.
70HMtJAN, McDONALD & NicKc.s, supra, at 14-2 to 14-4.
[Vol. 68
CHECK FRAUD LITIGATION
VI. WILL THE REVISIONS BE FURTHER REVISED?
As mentioned at the outset, the Revisions have been adopted
in 36 states. Several leading jurisdictions, including New York,
have not enacted the Revisions, however. It is possible that those
states will make certain changes instead of adopting the
Revisions in their current form, but will make certain changes.
In fact, there is already some ferment to that effect among
commentators.7' It may be that deliberations in New York's
legislature and elsewhere will lead to a movement to further
revise the Revisions. There is precedent for this. The original
U.C.C. was reworked in the early 1960's after deliberation in the
New York Law Revision Commission and the resulting 1962 act
was later adopted by all states. Thus Connecticut's P.A. 91-304
may not be the end of the process of reform and modernization
of check fraud law in Connecticut.
71See H. Bailey, supra, n34, New 1990 Uniform Commercial Code: Article 3,
Negotiable Instruments, and Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collections, 29 WIItAiMirrE
LAW REV. 409 (Summer 1993); Uniform Commercial Code Law Letter, January 1994,
p.1.
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